F rances Ferguson has memorably described "the sharp, sudden consciousness" of climate change as one that "comes upon us like the ominous tones of an intruder bent on murder when the babysitter picks up the telephone receiver in a horror film: 'I'm in the house'" (33). There is no refuge from this stranger within, nor from the feelings of panic his phone call incites. As I write these words, in the summer of 2018, the phone is ringing off the hook: above the Arctic Circle, record highs of 33°C/92°F were measured in Finland; a new record was set in Oman when the temperature did not drop below 42°C/108°F for twenty-four hours.
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ELIzAbETH CAROLyN MILLER VICTORIAN STUDIES / VOLUME 60, NO. 4 many academics have been relatively well protected from the ravages of climate change so far-my office window keeps the smoke outside, the University of Houston did not flood-but five miles north of the university, in a historically black neighborhood with a high flood risk, house after house was turned inside out: the sodden, wrecked contents of homes were piled in the street, pianos next to baby dolls next to lampshades ( fig. 1 ).
If these circumstances dictate-and I think they do-that climate change must move into every field of academic debate and every part of the university curriculum, it is equally the case that unique aspects of nineteenth-century britain and its Empire make our field particularly connected to the topic of climate change. For one thing, the geographies of climate change, including urban flood plain maps, bear a historical relation to European and American imperialism, and in a devastating turn of imperial modernity's screw, the impacts of climate change are now being borne disproportionately by those least responsible for them and least able to weather them. Thus Upamanyu Pablo Mukherjee begins Natural Disasters and Victorian Empire with a discussion of Hurricane Katrina, arguing that ideas about natural disaster today "grew out, in important ways, of the british imperial experience in nineteenthcentury Southeast Asia" (2). Similarly, while it would be too simplistic to say that Victorian England is answerable for the climate crisis, it would also be an error to discount its unique historical role in cultivating the fossil fuel economy and the resulting surge in greenhouse gas emissions.
3 The "workshop of the world," as benjamin Disraeli famously referred to industrial England, relied on coal combustion to accelerate production and speed transportation, forever transforming the scope of consumption habits, global trade, and imperial market-making (Disraeli n. p.).
Just as the climate has changed, then, our understanding of the past must transform along with it, and indeed, conventional notions of past, present, and future are troubled in any account of anthropogenic climate change.
Conventional notions of agency are troubled too, and mental life in the era of climate change can feel like a constant reckoning with the temporal paradoxes of time-travel stories: can something happen today to reverse the course laid by the past, or for the future? New understandings of geological and evolutionary time that emerged in the nineteenth century are, of course, crucial to our capacity to think in such terms at all. 4 As the articles in this special issue establish, developments in nineteenth-century science, narrative, and representation meant that Victorians were generating the tools to detect climate change and make sense of its long-term effects, even as they were producing the environmental changes that would require such detection.
This conflicted historical situation is discernible in the era's public discourse around climate science, as in an essay titled "Weather" that ran in the for Storm-Cloud. Like Ruskin, the author of "Weather" remarks on the strange weather of the day as an occasion for his observations, but his purpose is to introduce the lay reader to the new science of meteorology and its crucial distinction between "weather" and "climate": "the word climate is generally used to express the general average of the weather for a country or a district" (566). Rate of change is key here: "it is quite conceivable that the climate of a place may in the course of time undergo a change, but it would take a large number of observations to prove it." In other words, "though climate may change or be changed, we may almost assert it as an axiom that weather must change" (566). Despite having raised the possibility of a climate changing or being changed over time, and of this being proven by an accretion of weather 540 ELIzAbETH CAROLyN MILLER VICTORIAN STUDIES / VOLUME 60, NO. 4 measurements, the author backs down from this prospect in his final paragraph: "the climate remains, but the weather changes. Throughout all nature we find the same thing-perfect order and system, arising from infinite variety of detail" (579). The will to see nature as ordered and stable prevails: "the whole system is retained in that marvellous harmony and balance which is its peculiar characteristic" (579).
That the author of "Weather" acknowledges and denies climate change, all in the service of introducing readers to climate science, suggests how the very prospect of climate change, years before theories of the greenhouse gas effect took hold, struck at the heart of human susceptibilities regarding our place in the universe. 6 "Soft denialism" is the term Allen MacDuffie employs to describe such ways of thinking about the environment, and he reads such denialism as a protective gesture against human insignificance, one that can be traced back to nineteenth-century controversies over evolution. 
